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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs .
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM,
HOWARD H. HUCKS,
MARKWEST CORPORATION,
a California corporation,
and JOHN DOES I-X,

Case No. 89-0594-CA
Case Priority 16

Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals
of the State of Utah,

II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented on appeal:
A.

Did the U.S. Bankruptcy petition of the entity
Draper R.V. & Commercial Storage operate as a stay
against the action of plaintiff particularly if

1

defendants relied on the stay in bankruptcy while
plaintiff• s motion for stay was pending?
B.

Did the tr ial court abuse its discretion in denying
defendants

1

motion to file a counterclaim,

their

motions to set aside the summary judgment and the
motions to set aside the defaults of Howard H.
Hucks and Markwest
C.

Corporation?

Were there material controverted facts before the
court nece ssitating trial on the merits and making
summary ju dgment

improper?

The standard for review is set forth in
Morris v. Farn sworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297
(1953) to the effect that the party against whom
summary judgment has been granted is entitled to have
all the facts presented, and all the inferences
arising therefrom, considered in light most
to him.

fairly

favorable

Because disposition of a case on summary

judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits,
the appellate court must review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the losing party, and affirms
only where it appears there is no genuine dispute as to
any material issues of fact.
Inc., 595 P.2d 526

Themy v. Seagull Enters,

(Utah, 1979).

2

Ill.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following statutes and cases are
applicable:
ADDENDUM A:

Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 57-1-32, and
Utah Code Annonted, Sec. 57-1-33.

ADDENDUM B:

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55 (a)
(2); and
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(f);

ADDENDUM C:

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58
A (d);

ADDENDUM D:

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60
(b) ;

ADDENDUM E:

U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 11 USCS Sec. 362 (a)
(1) ;

ADDENDUM F:

U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 11 USCS Sec. 362 (c);

ADDENDUM G:

U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 11 USCS Sec. 1301
(a) ;

ADDENDUM H:

Rule 3 of the Rules of the Court of
Appeals.

IV.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendants entered into an agreement among
themselves to construct and operate a recreational
vehicle storage center in Draper, Utah.
defendant MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM

Originally

intended to construct

the project with his son, Wayne Burningham, but after

3

contacts with an initial lender, they were informed
they needed to bring in additional contract experience.
The defendants agreed among themselves that the general
contractor would be MARKWEST CORPORATION

(a company

operated by defendant HOWARD HUCKS), with Wayne
Burningham as the supervisor.

On January 9, 1987,

defendants executed a promissory note in the sum of one
million dollars

( $1, 000,000.00) , payable to SURETY LIFE

INSURANCE COMPANY, the long-term contractor.

A copy of

the note is attached as Exhibit "A" to the Complaint.
(R. 007.)

Defendant MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM

note individually.
K. BURNINGHAM,

signed the

Defendants HOWARD H. HUCKS, MELVIN

and a non-defendant Wayne Burningham

signed as guarantors to the note on the same date. (R.
101.)

In addition, defendants executed a trust deed

to the plaintiff which is referred to in the Complaint.
Defendants allege that the plaintiff SURETY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, as the long-term lender, was a partner
with United Savings, the construction lender, and that,
because of interference by the loan supervisors, cost
overruns and delays were incurred.

In addition, defen-

dants claim that, because of the refusal of the longterm lender and construction lender to release funds
for the project, including the release of monies for

4

advertising, the result was the folding of the project
and the defendants' default under the loan.

On the

15th day of September, 1987, counsel for the plaintiff
recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell.

On

July 27, 1988, the plaintiff conducted a Trustee Sale
at public auction for seven hundred thousand dollars
($700,000.00) for the property and buildings constructed, known as Draper RV & Commercial Center.
A few days prior to the Trustee Sale, non-defendant
Wayne Burningham caused a Petition to be filed in
Bankruptcy for Draper RV & Commercial Center.

Notice

was given to the trustee, Mr. Clark W. Sessions, who is
also counsel for the plaintiff. Because the
Bankruptcy Petition did not name any of the defendants
The trustee

refused to postpone the Trustee Sale.

In

the Trustee Deed, dated July 29, 1988, the trustee
referred to an

action of MELVIN KEITH BURNINGHAM

another suit wherein BURNINGHAM

in

referred to his

business as Draper R.V. & Commercial Storage. (R.

40.)

On September 14, 1988, a Complaint was filed naming
MELVIN K.

BURNINGHAM, MARKWEST CORPORATION as

designated defendants with JOHN DOES I through X.
Defendant MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM

filed an Answer to the

Complaint on October 18, 1988, signed by his counsel

5

J. Douglas Kinateder.

The answer referred to the

pending U.S. Bankruptcy Action

(R. 4 8 ) .

Among the

other defenses submitted in the answer was the failure
of the plaintiff to sell the property for market value.
On October 26, 1988, defendant MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM
filed a Motion To Set Aside or Vacate Trustee Sale of
Real Property in the same action,

(R. 105.)

The

Motion to Set Aside referred to the Bankruptcy case in
the name

of Draper RV & Commercial Storage in Case No.

88-4245 of the Bankruptcy Court for the Central
District of

Utah.

On October 21, 1988, plaintiff filed a Motion
to Amend Complaint to add causes of action pertaining
to the individual guarantors of the promissory note and
trust deed.

On November 7, 1988, defendant

filed

objections to the Motion to Amend the Complaint,
referring again to the automatic stay in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court.

The court did not grant leave to

file the amended complaint; however, until January 3,
1989.

(R. 141.)

In the meantime, plaintiff served

HOWARD H. HUCKS, individually and as president of
MARKWEST CORPORATION, with the original Complaint

which

did not mention the liability of the guarantors, on
October 20, 1988.

(R.109-112.)
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On October 27, 1988,

HOWARD HUCKS was served with a copy of the Amended
Complaint.

(R. 115.)
On November 7, 1988, plaintiff filed a Motion

for Relief From Stay in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and
mailed a copy of the motion to HOWARD HUCKS in Santa
Barbara, California.
just six

(R. 304.)

On January 9, 1989,

(6) days after the court signed permission for

plaintiff to file the Amended Complaint, a default
judgment was taken against HOWARD H. HUCKS and

MARKWEST

CORPORATION in the sum of $555,668.37 for failure of
MARKWEST or HOWARD H. HUCKS to respond to the Amended
Complaint.

A certificate of mailing of the default

judgement with a blank date of December, 1988 was
unsigned.

The unsigned certificate was addressed to J.

Douglas Kinateder, attorney for MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM,
but no reference was made to a certificate of mailing
to HOWARD HUCKS or MARKWEST CORPORATION.

(R. 145,146.)

The amount of the default judgment was $557,653.30.
Though counsel did not receive a copy of the judgment,
he did receive a copy of the default certificate and
filed, on January 20, 1989, a Motion to Set Aside the
Default of Defendant MARKWEST CORPORATION,

(R. 147-149)

with accompanying Affidavit in Support of Motion to Set
Aside the Default Judgment Against MARKWEST

7

CORPORA-

TION.

(R. 151.)

The motion was never responded to.

On March 8 r 1989, plaintiff filed its Motion
for Summary Judgment with no supporting affidavits, but
with a Memorandum which quoted portions of the
deposition transcript

taken of MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM.

On March 20, 1989, defendants filed Objection to Motion
for Summary Judgment and requested oral argument.

An

extension was requested to March 30, 1989 to submit
affidavits and Memorandum in Opposition.

On March 30,

1989, Wayne Burningham, son of defendant MELVIN K.
BURNINGHAM,

filed an Affidavit in Opposition to Motion

for Summary Judgment stating, among other things, that
he had been the manager of Draper RV & Commercial
Storage since the founding of the company in January,
1986, and had been the principal agent of MELVIN K.
BURNINGHAM,

that he was a licensed real estate broker,

and was familiar with the values of the storage project
and it was his opinion that the project as storage
condo units had the value of one million seven hundred
fifty thousand dollars

($1,750,000.00).

On April 5,

1989, plaintiff moved to strike Wayne Burningham's
affidavit, or in the alternative, submitted the
decision for ruling.

(R. 216.)

On April 7, 1989, a

Motion to Set Aside the Default of defendant HOWARD H.

8

HUCKS was filed.

(R. 221.)

The motion was supported

by an affidavit of J. Douglas Kinateder, attorney for
defendants, and dated April 10, 1989.

(R. 227.)

An

unsigned affidavit of HOWARD HUCKS also was filed in
support.

(R. 225.) HOWARD HUCKS was not able to sign

because the affidavit did not reach him in California
in time.

On April 8, 1989, HOWARD HUCKS signed his

affidavit in support of the motion to set aside.
Two very confusing events then quickly
followed.
Uno granted

On April 18, 1989, the Honorable Raymond S.
(according to Minute Entry) summary

judg-

ment pursuant to Rule 4-501 in favor of the plaintiff.
The Minute Entry is recorded as 246 of the record;
however, it bears no filing stamp.

On April 26, 1988,

Judge Uno issued a Minute Entry entitled,

"Court

Ordered Notice," and stated that the court on its own
motion ordered that oral argument is granted on
plaintiff's motion.

(R. 247.)

The matter was set for

hearing for April 27, 1989, at 9:00 AM.

Since the

plaintiff never filed a motion for oral argument, this
had to be in error as the defendant was the one who
requested the hearing on oral argument.

(R. 176-177.)

On April 27, 1989, at 9:00 AM, defendants' counsel
appeared for hearing and was informed by the clerk that

9

summary judgment had already been granted.

Upon

further inquiry and persistence, counsel for the
plaintiff appeared and in a conference with the court,
the court informed the parties that he would not sign a
summary judgment until the matter could be continued
for further hearing.

However, the court thereafter

behaved as if the summary judgment had been granted and
plaintiff and defendants had to labor under the premise
that they could only set aside the judgment pursuant to
Rule 60 B.
At the conference on April 27, 1989, the
court also stated that the defendants should tender
their counterclaim by filing, though the court refused
to rule on whether the counterclaim would be permitted.
The counterclaim was tendered by filing

(R. 248-258.),

and the matter was treated as if the defendants had
made an oral motion to file the counterclaim.
Plaintiff filed objection to defendants' motion to file
answer and counterclaim

(R. 265-267.) and plaintiff

replied to the counterclaim.

(R. 277 - 285.)

Thereafter, supporting affidavits to defendants'
position were filed, among which was one of Howard
Hucks wherein he testified that he believed a Stay of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court was in effect as he received

10

a copy of the Motion for Relief From Stay but never
received a copy of the Order relieving the stay.

(R.

291 -304.) The motion to vacate or set aside the
summary judgment was also filed as defendants were
unaware, or at least uncertain, whether the court was
considering arguments to set aside its summary

judgment

or whether the court had, in fact, not ruled on the
summary judgment issues. (R. 305 - 312.)

Thereafter,

supporting memoranda were filed which are part of the
record.

An affidavit of this counsel

(R. 291 - 294.)

states that in a thorough search of the bankruptcy
records at U.S. District Court, the order of relief
from stay on plaintiff's petition had never been signed
as of May 15, 1989. Plaintiff was granted relief from
stay after trial in December of 1988.

A copy of the

Order of Relief from Stay has never been made a part of
the record in the above appeal.
The summary judgment order of the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno has never been signed.

(R. 260-262.)

After oral argument on or about June 2, 1989,
on all pending motions the court signed an order on
June 12, 1989, (R.

341 - 343.) wherein the court

denied the motion of HOWARD HUCKS to set aside the
default judgment against him, denied the motion of

11

MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM
judgment.

to vacate or set aside the summary

It is from that order that this appeal is

taken.
V.
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD
The relevant facts and citations to the record
have been stated in the preceding STATEMENT OF THE
CASE.

VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant BURNINGHAM

argues that where the

defendants operated under the name of Draper RV &
Commercial Storage, the filing of the bankruptcy of
that entity should be treated as a stay in the proceedings until the Court signed its order lifting the
stay.

The order was not signed until June 4, 1989,

after the trial court made its final rulings granting
summary judgment and denying all motions of the defendants.

Defendant BURNINGHAM

also argues that the Court

abused its discretion in not setting aside the default
of defendants Howard Hucks and Markwest Corporation and
in not allowing the filing of a counterclaim of defendants.

Said counterclaim alleged damages caused by the

12

failure of plaintiff and its lending partner to timely
release funds for the completion of the storage units
and advertising.
Defendant BURNINGHAM argues further that
there were controverted and triable issues of fact
making the granting of summary judgment
namely, whether defendant BURNINGHAM

improper;

was(lncompetent)to

sign the guarantee after a stroke and the market value
of the property at the time of the Trustee's sale from
which the deficiency must be determined.

'-

VII.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE FILING OF THE BANKRUPTCY PETITION OF
DRAPER R.V. & COMMERCIAL STORAGE STAYED THE
SUIT OF PLAINTIFF IN DISTRICT COURT, OR AT
LEAST JUSTIFIED THE RELIEF REQUESTED OF
DEFENDANTS BEFORE DISTRICT COURT WHERE THEY
RELIED ON THE STAY AND PLAINTIFF'S ACTIONS.
Under the United States bankruptcy

law

actions in state courts are stayed against the debtor.
11 U.S.C.S. #362

(a)(1 - 4 ) , and #1301

(a) (See

addendum).

The stay exists until the case is closed or

dismissed.

11 USCS #362

(c)(2)(A)(B)

addendum.

Plaintiff was aware of the name of the
project for which the funds were expended and had
experienced

litigation over the project in another suit

13

with the Burninghams and Draper R.V. & Commercial
Storage in which restraining orders on earlier proposed
trustee sales by the plaintiff were sought.

Draper

R.V. was not a corporation but a partnership of the
defendants, which was known by the plaintiff.
Even if defendants were not named
individually on the bankruptcy petition filed a few
days before the trustee's sale, the defendants were codebtors with Draper R.V. & Commercial
11 USCS #1301

(a)(1)(2)

(Addendum).

storage.
The only

exceptions are when the debtors incurred the debt in
the ordinary course of their business or the case has
been dismissed.

In any event the remedy of plaintiff

would be to see a relief from stay.

This plaintiff

sought to do and sent a copy of the motion for relief
from stay to Howard Hucks. (R. 3 0 4 ) .

Plaintiff

obtained an oral ruling of relief from stay in mid
December 1988, but had continued in the meantime to
serve summons and complaints and amended complaints on
the defendants.

No order of relief from stay was ever

signed by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court as of May 15, 1989.
Howard Hucks stated under oath in his
affidavit that he relied on plaintiff's motion for
relief from stay in delaying to answer the Utah civil

14

suit.

(R. 298,299).
While plaintiff chose to mail Hucks a copy of

the Motion for Relief From Stay they did not choose to
mail him a copy of the default nor the default

\

judgment

nor their motion to amend the complaint nor the Order J
on the Motion permitting the amendment of the
complaint.

In the event the court should not determine

that the defendants were codebtors with Draper R.V. &
Commercial Storage, and therefore beneficiaries of the
automatic stay under 11 USCS #1301

(a), defendant

submits that the reliance on the stay at least
justifies a finding of excusable neglect under Rule 60
(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Order
of the Honorable Raymond S. Uno should be reversed and J
the case remanded for trial.

POINT II:

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN REFUSING TO
ALLOW DEFENDANTS TO FILE ANSWERS AND A
COUNTERCLAIM AND IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
In review of a summary judgment, the party

against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled
to have all the facts presented, and all the inferences
fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most
favorable to that party.

Morris v. Farnsworth Motel,

15

123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297

(1953).

The court, recognizing that the party
adversely affected by the summary judgment has not had
an opportunity for trial, therefore views the facts in
the light most favorable to that party.

Estate

Landscape J5 Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain
States Tel. £ Tel. Co., 793 P.2d 415

(Utah Ct. App.

1990).
In Christensen v. Financial Serv. Co., 14
Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010

(1963), the court stated a

party opposing a motion for summary judgment is not
required to file opposing affidavits, but may stand
upon his pleadings provided that his allegations, if
proved, would establish a basis for recovery.
The court ruled in Williams v. Barber, 765
P.2d 887

(Utah, 1988) that a defendant's failure to

oppose plaintiff's motion for partial summary

judgment

was a capitulation only on the question of whether
there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect
to his breach of duty, and granting judgment did not
relieve plaintiff of the obligation to prove any
damages he sustained that were proximately caused by
defendant's negligence.
On a motion for summary judgment against a

16

party, the court ruled that where some of the facts are
in dispute, a judgment can properly be rendered

against

him only if, on the undisputed facts, that party has no
valid defense.

Disabled Am. Veterans v. Hendrixson, 9

Utah 2d 152, 340 P.2d 416
In

BiH

(1959)

(emphasis added)

Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.

2d 238 (Utah, 1977), the court ruled that the presence j
of a dispute as to materials facts disallows the
granting of a summary

/

judgment.

The court stated that summary judgment is
never used to determine what the facts are, but only to
ascertain whether there are any material issues of fact
in dispute.

Hill ex rel Fogel v. Grand Cent., Inc., 25

Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150

(1970)

In order for a nonmoving party to oppose
successfully a motion for summary judgment and send the
issue to a fact-finder, it is only necessary for the
party to prove its legal theory and to show facts
controverting the facts as stated in the moving party's
affidavit.

It is not necessary for the nonmoving party

to prove its legal theory.

Salt Lake City Corp. v.

James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct.App.
1988)
The courts are, and should be, reluctant to
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invoke a remedy of summary judgment because such a
ruling prevents litigants from fully presenting their
case to the court.

Brandt v. Springville Banking Co.,

10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460

(1960)

The record must be carefully scrutinized to
see if the party presents allegations which, if true,
would entitled him to judgment because the party
against whom a summary judgment is entered is deprived
of the privilege of trial.
1266

Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d

(Utah 1976)

/

If there is any genuine issue as to any
material fact, the motion for summary judgment
be denied.

Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d

862, cert, denied,
Ed.

685

should

(1952);

344 U.S. 886, 73 S. Ct. 186, 97 L.
Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d

342

(Utah, 1978)
A summary

judgment is erroneous unless there

is a showing that the disfavored party cannot produce
evidence that would reasonably support a finding in its
favor on a material or determinative issue of fact.
Bridge v. Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P.2d 909

(1960)

A summary judgment was ruled improper where
affidavit in support of motion for summary judgment and
supporting documents showed unsupported conclusions and

18

unresolved issues of fact, even though the nonmoving
party did not present affidavits in opposition to
motion for summary judgment.
Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utahr

Frisbee v. K. &: IC Const.

1984)

The court ruled that a summary

judgment

dismissing an action to collect a promissory note was
improper because of the incompetency of the maker where
evidence that a guardian had been appointed for the
nonmoving party under the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act raised substantial fact issue.

Home Town Fin.

Corp. v. Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 368 P.2d 72

(1962)

The purpose of Sec. 57-1-33, Utah Code
Annotated, is to protect the debtor, who in a
nonjudicial foreclosure has no right of redemption,
from a creditor who could purchase the property at the
sale for a low price and then hold the debtor liable
for a large deficiency.

First Security Bank v. Felger,

658 F.Supp. 175 ID. Utah 1987) cited in Christenson v.
Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375

(Utah, 1988)

POINT III: THERE ARE CONTROVERTED FACTS AND ISSUES
JUSTIFYING TRIAL ON THE MERITS AS RAISED IN
THE PLEADINGS BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT.
Counsel for defendant Burningham signed the
answer for his client and the amended answer. (R.
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48, 49, 140-141).
issue of capacity

In the amended answer is raised the
(R. 140) for health reasons.

Counsel

realizes that there is nothing in the record to explain
defendant Melvin Burningham's health.

Counsel did not

have time for reasons explained in his affidavit to do
more than controvert the issue of damages.

(See

affidavit of J. Douglas Kinateder R. 291-294).
Defendant, through his counsel, submits however, that
there is evidence if not absolute proof, that defendant
was confused at his deposition, portions of which has
been offered by plaintiff.

Defendant Melvin

Burningham believed that the guarantee agreement and
the note were the same

(R.157).

He also cited

"Error

in Memory" or "Could not remember" at the time as
reasons for his corrections to his deposition

(R. 1 8 0 ) .

Should the court have permitted the filing of
the counterclaim issues of plaintiff's own
contributions to the losses on the project would be
examined under counts of fraud, breach of contract, and
breach of fiduciary duty.

(Counterclaim proffered

R.

248-258.)
The main issue to be tried is that of the
market value at the time of the trustee's sale.

This

sale took place under rush arrangements to avoid, where
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possible, the automatic stay.

Both answers of

defendant Burningham and the affidavits of Howard Hucks
and Wayne Burningham state their opinion

as to the

market value of the property being around a million
dollars higher than the price at the trustee's sale.
It is clear under 57-1-32 Utah Code Ann. (Addendum) the
debtor has a right to trial on the issue of market
value.

In First Sec. Bank v. Felger 658 F. Supp. 175

(D. Utah 1987), the federal court interpreting Utah Law
held the

purpose of the statute was to protect the

debtor from a creditor who could sell the property for
a low price and then hold the debtor liable for a large
deficiency.

VIII.
CONCLUSION
Because of the parties involvement in the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court during critical stages of the
proceedings in the above court, the lack of notices to
some of the defendants, even though notices may not
have been legally required, the affidavits of defendant
which were submitted, the actions of the District Court
in granting summary judgment and then scheduling
arguments on summary judgment and the confusing
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status

\A"

of the existence of the case thereafter, and most
importantly, for the controverted issues and facts
relating to damages, the case should be remanded for
trial and the Order of the Third Judicial District
Court overturned.

The damages involved are substantial

and the parties should be entitled to a trial on the
merits.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of
October, 1991.

J. DOUGLAS KINATEDER
Attorney for Appellant
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I, J. DOUGLAS KINATEDER, Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant

Melvin K.

Burningham, hereby

certify that on the 2nd day of October, 1991, the
original and seven copies of the foregoing Brief of
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Appeals, at 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake
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DATED this 2nd day of October, 1991.

J. DOUGLAS KINATEDER
Attorney for Appellant
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM
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57-1-30

REAL ESTATE

57-1-30. Sole of trust property by trustee — Corporate stock evidencing water rights
given to secure trust deed.
Shares of corporate stock evidencing water rights
used, intended to be used, or suitable for wise on the
trust property and which are hypothecated to secure
an obligation secured by a trust deed may be sold
with the trust property, or any part thereof, at the
trustee's sale in the manner provided in this act.
lWil

57-1-31. Trust deeds — Default in performance
of obligations secured — Reinstatement — Cancellation of recorded notice of default.
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum
of any obligation secured by a trust deed has, prior to
the maturity date fixed in such obligation, become
due or been declared due by reason of a breach or
default in the performance of any obligation secured
by the trust deed, including a default in the payment
of interest or of any installment of principal, or by
reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance
with the terms of the trust deed, taxes, assessments,
premiums for insurance, or advances made by the
beneficiary in accordance with terms of such obligation or of such trust deed, the trustor or his successor
in interest in the trust property or any part thereof or
any other person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record thereon or any beneficiary under a
subordinate trust deed, at any time witiiin three
months of the filing for record of notice of default
under such trust deed, if the power of sale is to be
exercised, may pay to the beneficiary or his successor
in interest the entire amount then due under the
terms of such trust deed (including costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of
buch obligation, or trust deed, and the trustee's and
attorney's fees actually incurred) other than such portion of the principal as would not then be due had no
default occurred, and thereby cure the default theretofore existing and, thereupon, all proceedings theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued and the obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be and remain in force and effect
the same as if no such acceleration had occurred.
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in the manner provided in Subsection (1), the
beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand of any
prison having an interest in the trust property, execute and deliver to him a request to the trustee to
execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of
the recorded notice of default under such trust deed;
and any beneficiary under a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for a period of 30 days after such demand, refuses to request the trustee to execute and
deliver such cancellation is liable to the person entitled to t»uch request for all damages resulting from
such refusal. A release and reconveyance given by
the trustee or beneficiary, or both, or the execution of
a trustee's deed constitutes a cancellation of a notice
of default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded notice of default under a triibt deed is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is sufficient if made
and executed by the trustee in substantially the following form:
Cancellation of Notice of Default
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed for record
, 19
, and record in
Book
, Page
, Records of
County, (or
filed of record
, 19
, with recorder's entry
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No.
,
County), Utah, which notice of default refers to the trust deed executed by
as
trustor, in which
is named as beneficiary and
as trustee, and filed for record
, 19
,
and recorded in Book
, Page
, Records of
County, (or filed of record
, 19
, with
recorder's entry No.
,
County), Utah.
(legal description)
Signature of Trustee
1SS5

57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Ac- 1
tion to recover balance due upon obligation for which trust deed was given
as security.
I
At any time within three months after any sale of
property under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided,
an action may be commenced to recover the balance I
due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was I
given as security, and in such action the complaint I
shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness I
which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for I
which such property was sold, and the fair market I
value thereof at the date of sale. Before rendenrur I
judgment, the court shall find the fair market value I
at the date of sale of the property sold. The courl may")
K51 render judgment lor more than the amount by J
which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, I
costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and I
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the I
property as of the date of the sale. In any action I
brought under this section, the prevailing party shall I
be entitled to collect iia costs and reasonable attorney |
feeb incurred in bringing an action under this section.
1SS5

57-1-33. Satisfaction of obligation secured by i
trust deed — Reconveyance of trust
property.
When the obligation secured by any trust deed has
been satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request
by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. The
reconveyance may designate the grantee therein as
"the person or persons entitled thereto." The beneficiary under such trust deed shall deliver to the
trustor or his successor in interest the trust deed and
the note or other evidence of the obligation so satisfied. Any beneficiary under such trust deed who refuses to request a reconveyance from the trustee for a
period of thirty days after written demand therefor is
made by the ti*ustor or his successor in interest shall
be liable to the trustor or his successor in interest, as
the case may be, for double damages resulting from
such refusal, or such trustor or his successor in interest may bring an action against the beneficiary and
trustee to compel a reconveyance of the trust property
and in such action the judgment of the court shall be
that the trustee reconvey the trust property and that
the beneficiary pay to the trustor, or his successor in
interest, as the case may be, the costs of suit including a reasonable attorney's fee and all damages re- J
suiting from the refusal of the beneficiary to request
a reconveyance as hereinabove provided.
imu
67-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee —
Foreclosure of truat deed — Limitation
of actions.
The trubtee's sale of property under a trust deed
shall be made, or an action to foreclose a trust deed as
provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on
real property shall be commenced, within the period

ADDENDUM

A

Rule 55

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 55. D e f a u l t
(a) D e f a u l t
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is Bought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk
shall enter his default.
"~ (2) Notice to party in d e f a u l t After the
entry of the default of any party, as provided in
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or
in the event t h a t it ia necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of
damages of the nondefaulting party.
(b) J u d g m e n t Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) liy the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served
otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of Una state, the clerk upon request
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the
amount due and costs against the defendant, if
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if
he is not an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By t h e c o u r t In all other cases the party
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is
necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it
deems necessary and proper.
(c) S e t t i n g a s i d e d e f a u l t . For good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, c o u n t e r c l a i m a n t s , cross-claima n t s . The provisions of this rule apply whether the
party entitled to the judgment tiy default is a plaintill', a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) J u d g m e n t against the state or officer or
a g e n c y thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the mate of Utah or against an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)

L

R u l e 56. S u m m a r y j u d g m e n t
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For d e f e n d i n g party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any tune,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
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mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material face and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) C a s e n o t fully a d j u d i c a t e d o n m o t i o n . If on
motion under tlua rule judgment is not rendered upon
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court a t the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleudings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which
the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) F o r m of affidavits; f u r t h e r t e s t i m o n y ; d e fense r e q u i r e d . Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as ia just.
«"
(g) Affidavits m a d e in b a d faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time t h a t
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose ot%
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Rule 57. Declaratory j u d g m e n t s .
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953,
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Rule 59

following manner (1) by written instrument, duly acknowledged bv such owner or attorney, or (2) by acknowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the
judgment in the county where first docketed, with the
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk Every satisfaction or a part of the judgment, or as to one or more
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming
Rule 58A. Entry.
them.
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judgthe court otherwise directs and subject to the provi- ment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of
sions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. have been lost, the court m which such judgment was
If there is a special verdict or a general verdict ac- recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof,
companied by answers to interrogatories returned by authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to
a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered
signed by the clerk and filed.
upon the docket.
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction
in Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case,
and filed with the clerk.
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also
(c) When judgment entered; notation in regis- enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, inter of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is cluding the amount paid, on the margin of the judgcomplete and shall bp deemed entered for all pur- ment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfacposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, tion.
when the same is signed and filed as herein above
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall
providpd The clerk shall immediately make a nota- have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any
tion of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon
judgment docket
—*^1 the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment The extent of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to
prnvnihng party shall promptly give notice of thej be a hen In case of partial satisfaction, if any execusigning or entry of judgment to all other parties and! tion shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk J execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of
of the court. However, the tim<» for filing a notice of J such partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement ofl collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from
this provision.
N • J the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other
(e) Judgment offer death of a party. If a party
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact counties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be have been entered on the judgment docket of the
county where such judgment was first docketed, a
rendered thereon
(0 Judgment by confession. Whenever a judg- certified transcript of satisfnction, or a certificate by
ment by confession is authorized by statute, the party the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with
seeking thr* samr» must file with the clerk of the court the clerk of the district court in any other county
in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, where the judgment may have been docketed Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be
verified by the defendant, to the following efTcct
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money made by the clerk of such court, and such entry shall
due or to become due, it shall concisely state the have the samp effect as in the county where the same
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is was originally entered.
justly dun or to become due;
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment,
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61,
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
and that the sum confessed therefor does not ex- and on all or port of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a
ceed the same,
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
a specified sum.
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the state- additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conment, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment clusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
entry, if any.
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985, Jan. 1, 1987.)
abuse of discretion by which cither party was
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment.
prevented from having a fair trial.
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judg(2) Misconduct of the jury, and whenever any
ment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any
one or more of the jurors have been induced to
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof,
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor
finding on any question submitted to them by the
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed
court, by resort to a determination by chance or
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
shall be in accordance with these rule*, and the right
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and
39 The existence of another adequate remedy docs
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases
where it is appropriate. The court mav order a speedy
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and
may advance it on the calendar.

Rule 60

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for
the party making the application, which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the iniluence of
passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry
of the judgment.
(c) Affidavit*; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1),
(2), (3), or (4), it aliali be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be
served may be extended tor an additional period not
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The
court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days
after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative
may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party,
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
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under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment.
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution or
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless
the court in its discretion and on such conditions for
the security of the adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs.
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment In its discretion and on such conditions for the
security of the adverse party as are proper, the court
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the disposition of a motion
for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made
pursuant to Uule 59, or of a motion for relief from a
judgment or order made pursuant to liule GO, or of a
llule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(u) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judg- motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for
ments, orders or other parts of the record and errors a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a
therein arising from oversight or omission may be motion for amendment to the findings or for addicorrected by the court at any time of its own initiative tional findings made pursuant to llule 52(b).
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereaf- court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore,
ter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected or grant an ii\junction during the pendency of the
I ^ wwlth-»leiive of the appellate court.
appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper for
jW/ (b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; the security of the rights of the adverse party.
fo Vnewly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken
I and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obI
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal rep- tain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited
I resentative from a final judgment, order, or proceed- by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or
I Ting for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadver- alter the time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay
I M^ngt;. «nrpiw-/ir itvi-n^hfc n *ffW; (2) newly discov- is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by
e r e d evidence which by due diligence could not have the court.
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof.
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denomi- When an appeal is taken by the United States, the
nated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for direction of any department of either, and the operaany cause, the summons in an action has not been tion or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no
personally served upon the defendant as required by bond, obligation, or other security shall be required
iiule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in from the appellant.
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment
(f) Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior the defendant is adjudged guilty of usurping, intrudjudgment upon which it is based has been reversed or ing into or unlawfully holding public office, civil or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that military, within this state, the execution of the judgthe judgment should have prospective application; or ment shall not be stayed on an appeal.
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the opera-"
(g) Power of appellate court not limited. The
tion of the judgment. The motion shall be made provisions in this rule do not limit any power of an
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to stay
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction, writ
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11 USCS § 362. Automatic stay
'
,
.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this..section a petition filed under section/
301. 302, or 303 of this title [11 USCS § 301, 302, or 303]. or an application filed
under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.
78ccc(a)(3)) [15 USCS § 78eee(a)(3)], operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,
of—
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the
case under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 ct scq.j, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title [11 USCS
§§ 101 et seq.];
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title [11
USCS §§ 101 et seq.];
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
^estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien
to tiie extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement
of the case under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.];
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.];
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title [11 USCS § 101 et seq.] against any claim
against the debtor; and
(K) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States
Tax Court concerning the debtor.
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title [11 USCS
§ 301, 302, or 303], or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78cee(a)(3)) [15 USCS § 78eee(a)(3)],
docs not operate as a stay—
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of
a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor;
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of alimony, maintenance,
or support from property that is not properly of the estate;
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect an interest in
property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such
perfection under section 546(b) of this title [11 USCS § 546(b)] or to the extent
that such act is accomplished within the period provided under section
547(e)(2)(A) of this tide [11 USCS § 547(e)(2)(A)];
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation
of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental
unit's police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment,
other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory
power;
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity broker,
forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or securities clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with commodity
contracts, as defined in section 761(4) of this title [11 USCS §761(4)]. forward
contracts, or securities contracts, as defined in section 741(7) of this title [11
USCS §741(7)], that constitutes the setoif of a claim against the debtor for a
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(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this
section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate; and
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section continues until
the earliest of—
(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title [11 USCS §§ 701 et seq.]
concerning an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title
^ - • [11 USCS §§ 901 et seq., 1101 et seq., 1201 et seq. or 1301 et seq.], the time a
discharge is granted or denied.
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by
terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay—
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property
of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this
section, if—
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section for relief from the
stay of any act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section,
such stay is terminated with respect to the party in interest making such request,
unless the court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued in effect
pending the conclusion of, or as a result of, a final hearing ^nd determination under
subsection (d) of this section. A hearing under this subsection may be a preliminary
hearing, or may be consolidated with the final hearing under subsection (d) of this
section. The court shall order such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion
of the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the
conclusion of such final hearing. If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing, then such final hearing shall be commenced not later than thirty days
after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing.
(0 Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or without a hearing, shall
grant such relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section as is
necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in property, if
such interest will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity for notice and a
hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section.
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section concerning relief from
the stay of any act under subsection (a) of this section—
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof on the issue of the
debtor's equity in property; and
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on all other issues.
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section
shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate
circumstances, may recover punitive damages.
(Nov. 6, 1978, P. L. 95-598, Title I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2570; July 27, 1982, P. L. 97222, §3, 96 Stat. 235; July 10, 1984, P. L. 98-353, Title III, Subtitle A, §304,
Subtitle C, § 363(b), Subtitle F, § 392, Subtitle H, § 441, 98 Stat. 352, 363, 365, 371;
Oct. 21, 1986, P. L. 99-509, Title V, Subtitle A, §5001, 100 Stat. 1911; Oct. 27,
1986, P.L. 99-554, Title II, Subtitles B, C, §§ 2570), 283(d) 100 Stat. 3115, 3116.)
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11 USCS § 1323.
11 USCS § 1324.
11 USCS § 1325.
11 USCS§ 1326.
11 USCS § 1327.
11 USCS §1328.
11 USCS § 1329.
11 USCS § 1330.

Modification of plan before confirmation
Confirmation hearing
Confirmation of plan
Payments
Effect of confirmation
Discharge
Modification of plan after confirmation
Revocation of an order of confirmation

SUBCHAPTER I—OFFICERS, ADMINISTRATION, AND THE
ESTATE
11 USCS § 1301. Stay of action against codebtor
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, after the order for
relief under this chapter [11 USCS §§1301 et seq.], a creditor may not act, or
commence or continue any civil action, to collect all or any part of a consumer debt
of the debtor from any individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor, or that
secured such debt, unless—
(1) such individual became liable on or secured such debt in the ordinary course
j
of such individual's business; or
J
(2) the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7 or 11 of
j ^
this title [11 USCS §§ 701 et seq. or 1101 et seq.].
(b) A creditor may present a negotiable instrument, and may give notice of dishonor
of such an instrument.
(c) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay provided by subsection (a) of this section with respect to a
creditor, to the extent that—
(1) as between the debtor and the individual protected under subsection (a) of
this section, such individual received the consideration for the claim held by such
creditor;
(2) the plan filed by the debtor proposes not to pay such claim; or
(3) such creditor's interest would be irreparably harmed by continuation of such
stay.
(d) Twenty days after the filing of a request under subsection (c)(2) of this section
for relief from the stay provided by subsection (a) of this section, such stay is
terminated with respect to the party in interest making such request, unless the
debtor or any individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor files and serves
upon such party in interest a written objection to the taking of the proposed action.
(Nov. 6, 1978, P. L. 95-598, Title I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2645; July 10, 1984, P. L. 98353, Title III, Subtitle A, § 313, Subtitle H, § 524, 98 Stat. 355, 388.)
HISTORY: ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Effective date of section:
Section 402(a) of Act
Nov. 6, 1978, provided that this section "shall take effect
on October 1, 1979.M.
Amendments:
1984. Act July 10, 1984, in subsec. (c)(4), inserted "continuation of*; and added
subsec. (d).
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43. Certification by the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
44. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals.

TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES

TITLE VII. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF APPEALS

RULE

1. Scope of rules.
2. Suspension of rules.
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS
OF TRIAL COURTS

3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
G. Bond for costs on appeal.
7. Security: Proceedings against sureties.
8. Stay or injunction pending appeal.
9. Docketing statement.
10. Motion for summary disposition.
11. The record on appeal.
12. Transmission of the record.
13. Notice of filing by clerk of appellate court.
TITLE m . REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND
COMMITTEES.

14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained;
intervention.
15. The record on review.
16. Filing of the record.
17. Stay pending review.
18. Applicability of other rules to review.
TITLE IV. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS; HABEAS CORPUS

19. Extraordinary writs.
20. Habeas corpus proceedings.
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Filing and service.
Computation and enlargement of time.
Motions.
Briefs.
Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem.
Filing and service of briefs.
Form of briefs.
Prehearing conference.
Oral argument.
Decision of the court: Dismissal; notice of decision.
Expedited appeals decided after oral argument
without written opinion.
Interest on judgment.
Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees.
Award of costs.
Petition for rehearing.
Issuance of remittitur.
Suggestion of mootness; voluntary dismissal.
Substitution of parties.
Duties of the clerk.
Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and
discipline.

45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of Court
of Appeals.
46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
47. Certification and transmission of record; filing;
parties.
48. Time for petitioning.
49. Petition for writ of certiorari.
50. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus
curiae.
51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari.
FORMS

TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES.
Rule 1. Scope of rules.
(a) Applicability of rules. These rules govern the
procedure before the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals of Utah in all cases. Applicability of these
rules to the review of decisions or orders of administrative agencies is governed by Rule 18. When these
rules provide for a motion or application to bo made
in a district, juvenile, or circuit court or an administrative agency, commission, or board, the procedure
for making such motion or application shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the rules of practice
of the trial court, administrative agency, commission,
or board.
(b) Reference to "court." Except as provided in
Rule 43, when these rules refer to a decision or action
by the court, the reference shall include a panel of the
court. The term "trial court" means the court or tribunal from which the appeal is taken. The term "appellate court" means the court to which the appeal is
taken.
(c) Procedure established by statute. If a procedure is provided by state statute as to the appeal or
review of an order of an administrative agency, commission, board, or officer of the state which is inconsistent with one or more of these rules, the statute
shall govern. In other respects, these rules shall apply to such appeals or reviews.
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules
shall not be construed to extend or limit tho jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals as
established by law.
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure and abbreviated Utah
R. App. P.
Rule 2. Suspension of rules.
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court, on its own motion or for extraordinary
cause shown, may, except as to the provisions^ of
Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), and 48, suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a
particular case and may order proceedings in that
case in accordance with its direction.

TITLE VI. CERTIFICATION AND TRANSFER BETWEEN
COURTS

41. Certification of questions of law by United States
courts.
42. Transfer of case from Supreme Court to Court of
Appeals.

TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS
AND ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a district, juve-
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nile, or circuit court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all Anal orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court
within the tune allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing
of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the
appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include
dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. It two or more
parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder
practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or
may join in an appeal of another party after filing
separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant.
Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of
the appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the
appeal aha 11 be known as the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the
appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate
court, the party making the original application shall
be known as the petitioner and any other party as the
respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part
thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from
which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the
court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking
the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice of
appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by
counsel, then on the party at the party's last known
address.
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals.
At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or
cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing
i'eea as are established by law, and also the fee for
docketing the appeal in the appellate court. The clerk
of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal
unless the filing and docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the
notice of appeal and payment of the required i'eta, the
clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit
one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of
its filing, together with the docketing fee, to the clerk
of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the
notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the
appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the
docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title
given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be
added to the title.
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order* In a
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of
right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with
the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the
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date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action,
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after
the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely
motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment
under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or
make additional findings of fact, whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required if the
motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or
amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new
trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from
the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a
timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an
order, alter judgment, affecting the substantial rights
of a defendant, the time for appeal for all parties shall
run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other such motion. A notice
of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the
above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial court
disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order.
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of
the judgment or order of the trial court shall be
treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof'.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice
of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file
a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within
the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a) of this
rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court,
upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause,
may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this
rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the
other parties in accordance with the rules of practice
of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days
past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of
entry of the order granting the motion, whichever
occurs later.
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal
from an interlocutory order may be sought by any
party by filing a petition for permission to appeal
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 20
days after the entry of the order of the trial court,
with proof of service on all other parties to the action.
(b) Fees and copies of petition. The petitioner
shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court an
original and seven copies of the petition, or, with the
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, an original and four
copies, together with the fee for filing a notice of up-

